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Reviewed by Abraham S. Goldsteint
The report on New Directions in Legal Education was sponsored by
the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education at a time of campus
ferment.' The mood was one of anger and tension growing out of an
unpopular war, searingly confusing race relations, and conflicting life
styles. It is little wonder, therefore, that Professors Packer and Ehrlich,
organizing their ideas from 1968 to 1970 and writing in 1971, would
take a sense of "malaise" as their starting point and strike a curiously
ambivalent tone. At times, they seem to regard law and legal education
as incredibly subtle and complex, a mysterious art not easily mastered.-'
At others, as when they deprecate "doctrinal" or "library" research,"
they treat law almost condescendingly.
The ambivalence continues as they describe the first year of law
school as "a pedagogic triumph," 4 while characterizing the second and
third as a tedious "academic wasteland." 5 They then conclude that
the nature of legal education has been to train students in some
basic fundamentals (analysis, legal theory, the general substantive
map, etc.) only and that as a result the law school graduate gener-
ally is not competent to do anything very well. Experience is the
real teacher of specific tasks .... 
They leave the reader with a picture of "disappointed and impatient
students [who] interact with increasingly frustrated and confused teach-
" Dean and Cromwell Professor of Law, Yale Law School; member, Advisory Coin.
mittee to the Report.
1. H. Packer & T. Ehrlich, NEw DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL EDUCATION: A RutoR' ItEI'ARED









ers and emerge with a patchwork professional education and an ambi-
valent view of themselves as professionals.
'
IT
Though such an apocalyptic mood may spur inquiry, it is not at all
conducive to clarity, in either defining problems or proposing solu-
tions. This is particularly true once passions have run their course and
education is again perceived as neither a scapegoat nor a panacea for
more fundamental problems.
Much of the report builds on this impressionistic and time-bound
sense of student dissatisfaction. Yet we are told very little about what
students find wrong with their courses or with the law school as an
administrative or social unit. Nor are we told what faculty or admin-
istrators think on these issues, or whether recent graduates are un-
equal to the tasks given them by lawyers and judges. Indeed, the re-
port seems almost proudly to assert that "[t]he 'research' on which
this study is based did not include field studies, questionnaires, or
opinion polls." I do not mean to suggest that empirical research is
always essential. But when "malaise" among students and faculty
looms so large in pointing towards "new directions in legal education,"
the reader is surely entitled to know the bases for the authors' conclu-
sions, whether their informants were accurately describing mental
states not only for 1968-70 but also for the present, and, above all,
whether it is in fact true that the law school years move so rapidly
from "triumph" to "wasteland."
Regretfully, the report provides little or no evidence to support its
conclusions. It is really an introductory essay, eighty-five pages in
length, composed of interesting and provocative observations on sub-
jects as diverse as history, clinical education, finance, the law school
and the university, and the nature and length of legal education.,
It is, therefore, summary in nature and conclusory in tone. Yet the
auspices under which the report was written and the high professional
reputation of its authors may give it undue influence in current debate
about legal education.
The risk is particularly great that too much attention will be paid
to the report's recommendation that law school be reduced to two
years. 10 The recommendation seems particularly disembodied because
7. P.34.
8. P. xvi.
9. The balance of the volume consists of the Carrington Report, prepared by a com-
mittee of the Association of American Law Schools in 1971, p. 95, its appendices. and
Calvin Woodard's The Limits of Legal Realism: An Historical Perspective, 54 VA. L
Rv. 689 (1968), reprinted at p. 331.
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it does not build upon a detailed consideration of what is being taught
or written, where the profession is moving, and whether the schools
should move with it. The reader is never taken inside any of the
major fields of legal study to assess what teachers are doing and whether
their efforts are adequate. As a result, he cannot know the extent to
which a facade of unchanging course titles may conceal great, even dra-
matic, changes in the curriculum. Yet it is true that where criminal
law, as little as twenty-five years ago, concerned itself almost entirely
with the elements of offenses, it is now both more theoretical and more
practical: Students learn not only about the general theories of crimi-
nal liability but are also drawn into the administration of criminal
law through clinical programs and empirical research.
The same patterns exist in other fields. The property course has be-
come a point of entry for the study of land planning and finance, hous-
ing and environmental regulation. "Contracts" has evolved into a rich
variety of courses in the commercial field. "Corporations" is now sev-
eral courses and seminars, including corporate finance, securities regu-
lation, and corporate responsibility. Administrative law is no longer
confined to an introductory course in procedure; there are now courses
and seminars dealing with its underlying substance: the regulation of
transportation, energy, communications, welfare, and education.
The report takes note of some of these developments not by describ-
ing them but rather by concluding, quite properly, that the legal pro-
fession is becoming increasingly specialized and that a unitary bar is no
longer possible." It then presents Bayless Manning's perceptive sum-
mary12 of the qualities of first-rate lawyers: They must possess (a)
analytic skills sufficient to surround a problem, surveying it from many
different perspectives; (b) substantive legal knowledge, not only in their
area of specialization but sufficient to locate themselves and their cli-
ents' problem on the general map of substantive law; (c) basic work-
ing skills involving writing, research, drafting, and advocacy; and (d)
familiarity with the institutional environment, legal and non-legal-
courts, administrative agencies, legislatures-and the degree to which
one must call upon accountants, psychiatrists, doctors, economists,
market analysts, sociologists, or statisticians.
The gaping void in the report is its failure to reconcile its recom-
mendation for compressing legal education with Manning's portrait
of the competent lawyer. Such reconciliation would be possible only if
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The authors avoid the incredible difficulties of this task by telling us
what is already undeniable: That it is no longer possible to teach all of
the law within three years. Having laid this ghost to rest, they make
a giant stride to the unverified assertion that "no attempt is actually
made to teach the students very much of the doctrine of the subjects
they study .... ,"13 They then conclude that method is the key to the
educational puzzle and that the real "genius of legal education"14 lies
in teaching first-year students the "method to use in hacking 'through
the underbrush"' of legal rules.1 5
It is probably true that the so-called Socratic method which domi-
nates the first year is especially well suited for training law students.
By introducing them to the courts, the case method, and especially
the realization that legal doctrine is remarkably open-textured, it sets
the stage for them to play out their role as some of the last generalists
in an age of specialization. In the first year, they learn to move quickly
in and out of complex fact situations, to grasp what is known and what
is not in an ever-proliferating variety of fields and a setting that is
adversary in nature. What it cannot do is prepare them sufficiently to
apply these arts to the wide variety of roles, subject matters, and insti-
tutional settings in which they may become involved.
Such preparation obviously depends on something more durable
than a "method." We do attempt in the first year to teach the central
ideas underlying legal obligation-in torts, contracts, and criminal law.
We try to grasp the central themes of public law and to provide an
accurate sense of procedure. In short, we teach the "doctrine" and the
"legal principles" which are fundamental to what will follow in more
advanced training. Inevitably, however, a first and introductory year
cannot provide a framework which is broad enough: A single year
simply cannot provide adequate exposure to the many fields of the
law, much less to the non-legal disciplines which impinge upon it.
It is the office of the second and third years to give the student the
perspectives and skills Manning describes. Properly used, they can dis-
pel the illusion created by the first year, that law is to be equated with
the opinions of appellate courts. They should also provide students
with a sense of the history and philosophy of law and of the extent to
which it is part of a larger system of social control in order that they
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The proposals for a two-year law school would press law students to
crowd this second year with "bread and butter" courses. They would
have little or no time or inclination to explore the unusual or the
theoretical. They could not do very much with the new clinical and
field research programs. They would have little time for legal writing
in either the traditional reviews or the newer interdisciplinary jour-
nals. And they would certainly be unable to test their interest or apti-
tude for specialized fields, either in the law school or through their
summer work in firms.
The report would solve what it regards as one of the most urgent
problems of legal education, the training of specialists, by leaving it to
the organized bar. By a curious sleight-of-hand, the report equates such
specialized education with "how-to-do-it training"; since law schools
allegedly provide such training even less well than they teach "sub-
stance," Professors Packer and Ehrlich conclude that the task must be
assigned to some other agency. 1 Yet if specialized training is to be
taken seriously, it will have to do for the trainees the same things done
by the first year for entering students: Lawyers would have to be
introduced to a literature and to institutions, to major developmental
themes and to the theories underlying them. And yet there will be
available to the bar the same limited set of techniques available to
the law schools for accomplishing the tasks of instruction: lecturing,
engaging in Socratic or other dialogue, dealing with sets of problems,
serving some type of apprenticeship.
Plainly, such training will be successful only if there are teachers
with the time, the knowledge, and the resources. This is not likely to
be found in members of the bar called away from a busy practice to
present "how-to-do-it" sessions. It will be furnished only by a faculty
and a research enterprise which has penetrated deeply enough into the
many fields of law to separate them into their component parts, to cap-
ture their dynamics, and to relate them to a larger whole.
It is just such a deeper and broader consideration which American
legal education has been engaged in since sociological jurisprudence
and legal realism entered the academic lists. Against heavy obstacles-
huge classes, small faculties, periodic wars, domestic crises-we have
begun to address our fields in systemic terms, treating law not merely
16. P. 14. It is true that the report speaks, almost in passing, about an optional third
year as a period of advanced research and writing. But it is given so little attention as to
make one suspect it is simply a makeweight; we have no real details as to what will be
done with it, who will stay for it, and whether it will be converted into a meaningful
research enterprise. o
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as a professional discipline but also as a potential science, with a theo-
retical framework about how and at what costs law develops. This
broadened conception-which makes "law," not the practice of law,
the primary concern-has coincided with a "legal explosion" which has
left law occupying every conceivable aspect of our lives. When this
near-infinity of legal rules is placed next to the broadened perspective
of what legal study should include, we are left with innumerable
permutations and combinations. With so much to know about so
many fields of law, with so many points at which those fields intersect
with other disciplines and institutions, this hardly seems the time to
reduce the length of legal education or to conceive of specialized train-
ing in "how-to-do-it" terms.
The critical issue with regard to such training is not whether the
law schools can do it better than the bar, but rather whether they should
require students to choose their specialties while in law school. The
report states flatly, without supporting argument, that "today's law
student is in no position during his years in law school to decide what
area he would like to specialize in."' lr The authors ignore the fact that
most students engage in de facto specialization in any event-either
because the economy dictates it, because they know in some general
way what type of work they want to do, or because the law schools pre-
sent them with specialized courses in certain areas. Moreover, the au-
thors make no effort to distinguish this problem from that of choosing
a "major" in college, a practice widely followed at a much earlier age
because it is the only way to go beyond a superficial understanding of
things.
It is only when we focus on laying the groundwork for specialized
training that it becomes apparent how inadequate are the resources
of legal education. At every turn, we are confronted with the fact that
there are not enough faculty in any particular area to divide up what
needs to be done or to duplicate innovative research often enough to
allow for error. Where there is empirical work to be done, we find
lawyers untrained and others uninterested in doing it. Where we need
insights from psychology, economics, or biology, we find those fields
so specialized and so little interested in the law that we must do the
knowledge-building ourselves.
Identifying such difficulties, however, is quite different from sound-
ing a retreat. We are at an important point in legal education, with
17. P. 14.
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some hope of developing clearer theoretical foundations, more firmly
rooted in social reality than in the past. But to do this, we need time,
resources, and commitment. The proposal for a two-year law school
would give up the hope of serious advanced training and scholarship
just at the moment it has developed some momentum. It would inhibit
innovation and force lawyers into a narrower and more vocational
mold. It would be, in short, a serious mistake, based on little more
than vague assertions about student discontent in a time which may
have already passed us by.
Reviewed by Louis F. Oberdorfert
My review of New Directions in Legal Education1 must begin with
a brief tribute to its fallen author. Herbert Packer's gallant fight
against paralyzing illness, and his recent death as he approached what
should have been his most productive years, was a grievous loss to his
family, his profession, and his nation. He was a noble and loyal friend.
His students reflect his sparkling intellect and massive integrity. He
came as near as any of his generation to mastering both the occult
world of law teaching and that other world more familiar to prac.
titioners, both in and out of government. He was stricken while being
battered as the interface between his university and the rising tide of
student unrest. His bibliography2 would distinguish many who were
not struck down in the prime of life.
It is a blessing, therefore, that Herb Packer's earlier contribution
t Member of the Bar, Alabama and District of Columbia.
1. H.L. PACKER & T. EHRLICH, NEv DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL EDUCATION (1972).
2. A partial bibliography would include the following: Books: THE LIMtITs OF TIii
CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968); THE STATE OF RESEARCH IN ANTI-TRUST LAW (1963); Ex.CoI-
MUNIST WITNESSES: FOUR STUDIES IN FACT-FINDING (1962). Articles: The Aims of the Crimi-
nal Law Revisited: A Plea for a New Look at "Substantive Due Process," 44 So. CAL. L.
REv. 490 (1971); Mr. Barzun and Capital Punishment, 15 CRIME & DELINQUENCy 28 (1969);
Symposium on the Supreme Court and the Police: The Courts, the Police and the Rest
of Us, 57 J. CRI.M. L. C. & P.S. 238 (1966); Civil Rights and Disobedience to Law: A Law.
yer's View, 36 N.Y.S.B.J. 290 (1964); Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 -IAsV.
L. REv. 1071 (1964); Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1964);
Symposium on the Model Penal Code: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 63 COLI.
L. RFv. 594 (1963); Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SuP. CT. RLv. 107; The Case
for Revision of the Penal Code, 13 STAN. L. Rtv. 252 (1961); Therapeutic Abortion: A
Problem in Law and Medicine, 11 STAN. L. REv. 417 (1959); A Tale of Two Typewriters,
10 STAN. L. REv. 409 (1958).
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will not be judged by his last work. The book is, to be fair, incom-
plete, both in concept and detail. Yet I fear that the thinness of the
book is largely a reflection of the failure of the law teaching profes-
sion collectively to work and think hard enough about its responsi-
bility to its students, to its universities, to the bar, and to society for
the resources which have been entrusted to it. The report of Professor
Paul Carrington, which is appended to the book and almost dwarfs
it, is the most serious effort at self-evaluation of law schools and their
performance. But that report, while provocative and stimulating, has
apparently generated more heat than light among the teaching bar.
A fuller and more critical study than that which Professors Packer
and Ehrlich were able to mobilize may well reveal that the curriculum
priorities of what the authors term the "elite" law schools are de-
signed more for the benefit and enjoyment of the teachers than the
taught. The teachers understandably relish a deep satisfaction from
their role in the "pedagogic triumph ' 3 which characterizes the re-
sponse of well-selected first-year law students to the Socratic therapy
which is the specialty of "elite" law school teachers. The same intel-
lectual aggressiveness which qualifies these teachers so well as ther-
apists may not, however, adapt itself to the less entertaining task of
supervising written work, providing clinical experience for students,
solving the financial crisis of university and law school, attacking ener-
getically the justice administration crisis, and other semi-drudgeries.
The book exposes, by what it says and what it leaves unsaid, consid-
erable disarray among and between the law faculties as to how the
resources and people committed to legal education can be most con-
structively engaged.
Perhaps my negative reaction to the book is exacerbated by the fact
that while I was contemplating this review, I had occasion to read
David Halberstam's The Best and The Brightest.4 Halberstam's su-
perficiality seriously discredits his work. Yet, each of the officials de-
meaned by Halberstam had already been the victim of some of his
own revealing memoranda and reports.5 Each official so exposed was
(or, had he attended law school, probably would have been) a prize
product of our "elite" legal education system. The brightest and the
best were, each of them, trained and moulded in or after school as
potential Philosopher-Kings. A serious flaw in the public performance
3. NEw DIRcToNs IN LEGAL EDUCATION 31.
4. D. HALBERPSrAm, THE BEsT AND THE BRIGHTEST (1972).
5. See THE PENTAGON PAPERS: As PuBLiSHED BY THE NEW YORK Ta1.m (G. Gold, A.
Siegal & S. Abt eds. 1971).
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of these Philosopher-Kings, as portrayed by themselves as well as by
Halberstam, was their failure fully to appreciate and respect the po-
litical process and to take properly into account the ultimate wisdom
and judgment of the people. Granted there is a vital role in our so-
ciety for law school trained Philosopher-Kings; but I fear that more
of the attention of our law schools than is justified has been devoted
to their development and placement. The first-year Socratic process
administered by brilliant, self-confident interrogators may fail to nour-
ish, and may indeed discourage, the kind of humility which engenders
faith and confidence in the non-elite.
This is not to say that the leaders of the law teaching profession have
ignored the various challenges to the validity of their priorities. For
example, Professors Packer, Ehrlich, and Carrington face up manfully
to the limits of the law schools in staffing the nation's need for legal
services. The debate has sometimes focused on the question of whether
law schools should be two or three years. There is the view that once
law teachers have administered the first-year therapy and added some
substantive intelligence to their naturally gifted students, they may
well surrender to others outside academia the task of completing the
education and training which many students require to satisfy their
goals and the needs of their society.
The defenders of the faith contend variously that the therapists
cannot finish their treatment nor provide adequate training in spe-
cific substantive areas in less than three years, and that clinical experi-
ence and training in law school is either overrated, unnecessary, or
premature.
I do not profess to know the answer to either that question or the
corollary questions which subsume it. I do know, or at least believe,
that our profession, including its teaching arm, must continue with
greater vigor to re-examine its function and its priorities. I, for one,
am not satisfied that providing elite law schools for other than poten-
tial Philosopher-Kings would be a waste of talent, or that faculties can
safely and fairly continue to offer clinical training on a take-it-or-leave-
it basis. I am disappointed at the consistent reluctance of some law
teachers to become involved in the teaching of law writing and speak-
ing. Moreover, I have seen no organized, serious, and continuing ef-
fort by the law faculties to design mechanisms to redress the cruel
imbalance between the legal services available to those who have and
the services available to those who have not. The crushing impact of
the explosion of litigation on the courts and our whole system of jus-
tice has not attracted the spirited interest and attention of many legal
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scholars and institutions who could, if they only would, contribute
much more to designing and advocating solutions. I fear that (with
magnificent exceptions like Herbert Packer) too many law teachers
are more interested in their freedom to study, teach, and write what
they please than in identifying and fulfilling the needs of students and
society for legal training and services.
What Professors Packer and Ehrlich have said was certainly worth
saying. What they have left unsaid cries out for energetic and imagina-
tive attention by their peers.
Report of the New York State Commission on the Quality, Cost and
Financing of Elementary and Secondary Education. New York: Viking
Press, Inc., 1973. Pp. x, 480. $14.95 (clothbound), $6.95 (paperback).
Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effect of Family and Schooling in
America. By Christopher Jencks, Marshall Smith, Henry Acland, Mary
Jo Bane, David Cohen, Herbert Gintis, Barbara Heyns & Stephen
Michelson. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1972. Pp. xii, 358. $12.50.
Reviewed by Chester E. Finn, Jr.t
I. Equality: Of Opportunities, Treatment, and Results
At the heart of mhuch of our public discourse (and discord) during
the last decade has been a fundamental disagreement over the meaning
of "equality" as applied to various social problems. Two recent studies
carry the debate further in the field of public education and suggest
some rather critically important implications.'
Probably the most familiar definition of "equality" is that of equality
of opportunity, the principle that every citizen should be free from
t A.B. 1965, M.A.T. 1967, Ed.D. 1970, Harvard University.
1. C. JENCKS, M. SMrrH, H. ACtAND, M. BANE, D. COHEN, H. GL¢rts, B. HLY.%S & S.
MICHELSON, INEQUALITY: A REASSESSMENT OF THE EFFEcr OF FAMILY AND SHIOOUNG IN
AMRmmCA (1972) [hereinafter cited as JENcKS]; REroPT OF THE NEW YoRK STATE Comt-
MISSION ON THE QUALITY, Cosr AND FINANCING OF ELEtMFNrARY AND SECONDARY E DLCATION
(1973) [hereinafter cited as FLEISCHMANN].
1101
The Yale Law Journal
non-meritocratic discriminations in pursuing his ambitions.2 In the
public sector, such a principle presumably requires that any govern-
ment service be provided to every citizen on a strictly equal basis.
Hence, at least in the public sector, equality of opportunity soon be-
comes a second type of equality, equality of treatment.3
But while theoretically required, equality of treatment may, in
practice, be extremely inefficient. In education, for example, a policy
of providing precisely identical schooling may actually impede the
progress of individuals who begin school with significant differences
in ability resulting from genetic or environmental characteristics. The
problem thus becomes one of justifying-in some principled way-dif-
ferentials in the provision of public services.
One approach is that of providing some minimum level of govern-
mental support so as to protect every citizen from economic harm.
The problem, of course, is that once such a standard is established,
the level deemed essential can almost always be raised on the some-
what contrary theories that 1) the service in question is effective in
reducing societal inequality, but 2) more than the amount presently
offered is necessary to remedy the wide gap between the haves and
have-nots which continues to exist.
Until very recently, public education was so analyzed. A "minimum
standard" was defined in relatively quantifiable terms-student-teacher
ratios, per pupil expenditures, and the like-and was continually raised
by aspiring parents and avid educators. Yet, despite our good inten-.
tions, substantial variances in schooling remained: Suburban school
systems maintained a far higher level of services than those of rural
or urban America; 4 and within systems "tracking" segregated the tal-
ented from the less gifted (or less white), assigning different curricula
and teachers to each.
5
In the mid-sixties, a different type of "unequal" treatment was
advanced by the compensatory education programs of the War on
Poverty. This more purposeful and perhaps more justified "inequality
of treatment" was based on the assumption that the disadvantaged
child must be compensated for deprivations in his early upbringing.
The primary goal of such programs was to insure that the disadvan-
2. See Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 12 (1969).
3. See, e.g., Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub noom. Snuck
v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
4. See 2 UNITED STATES ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
FISCAL BALANCE IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 5-6, 64-70 (1967).
5. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 511-14 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub noa. Sinuck
v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 D.C. Cir. 1969).
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taged would leave the public schools with the same level of learning
-measured by the innumerable tests of educational achievement-as
his middle-class rival. The proponents of such programs thus hoped
to move public education from mere equality of treatment to a more
significant equality of result.6
However, a number of studies soon challenged the very idea that
equality of educational result was achievable. By far the most impor-
tant was the extensive survey conducted for the United States Office
of Education entitled Equality of Educational Opportunity,7 known
popularly as the Coleman Report. The Report confronted equal-edu-
cation warriors with a number of rather disconcerting findings: By
the mid-sixties school facilities and resources were already relatively
equal within each region of the nation.8 There were, however, wide
variations in student achievement as measured by standardized tests:
Minority youngsters scored significantly below white ones; Southern
students, below Northeastern ones; lower-socioeconomic pupils, below
higher ones. 9 There was also a greater variation in achievement within
individual schools than among them. 0 Finally, variables other than
school programs or facilities-notably socioeconomic status-correlated
strongly with student achievement."1 The Coleman Report thus cast
serious doubt on the assumed relationship between "school inputs"
and "educational quality"-2-a relationship which was and still is criti-
cal to any hope for equality of either treatment or result.
II. The Fleischmann Report: Equalizing Taxpayers and Students
Resistance to Coleman's conclusions has, however, been tenacious.
Most notably a number of state and lower federal courts-in declaring
6. President Johnson proclaimed his affirmative action program in the following terms:
Imagine a hundred yard dash in which one of the two runners has his legs shackled
together. He has progressed 10 yards, while the unshackled runner has gone 50
)ards. At that point the judges decide that the race is unfair. How do they rectify
the situation? Do they merely remove the shackles and allow the race to proceed?
Then they could say that "equal opportunity" now prevailed. But one of the run-
ners would still be forty yards ahead of the other. Would it not be the better part
of justice to allow the previously shackled runner to make up the forty yard gap;
or to start the race over again? That would be affirmative action towards equality.
Quoted in Bell, On Meritocracy and Equality, THE PUBuc ItMErEssr, Fall, 1972, No. 29.
at 44.
7. OFFICE OF EDUCATION, U.S. DEPARTMEN OF HEALTH, EDUcATO.N, A%D WLLvzU,
EQUALrY OF EDUCATIONAL OeeoTuNrrY (1966).
8. Id. at 8-20.
9. Id. at 21-22.
10. Id. at 21-23, 330.
11. Id. at 22-23, 330.
12. See, e.g., CS. BENsoN, THE CHEERFUL PRosi.wr: A STAT. rJNT ON THE Frruile. OF
PBLIUC EDUCATION 22-26 (1965); H. JAMES, J. Tno.As & H. DYcK, WEALTH, E.XPENDInUrS
AND DECISION-MaxING FOR EDUCATION 125 (1963).
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that financing education through local property taxes unconstitution-
ally discriminates against poor children by making their education a
function of the wealth of their school districts' 3-assumed both that 1)
school expenditures are related to educational quality and 2) success
in school is related to success in later life.
14
The Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez'5 has, in turn, questioned both of these views and, in a
burst of judicial modesty taken itself-and at least the lower federal
courts6-out of the debate:
On even the most basic questions in this area the scholars and edu-
cational experts are divided. Indeed, one of the hottest sources of
controversy concerns the extent to which there is a demonstrable
correlation between educational expenditures and the quality of
education. . . . Related to the questioned relationship between
cost and quality is the equally unsettled controversy as to the
proper goals of a system of public education. . . The ultimate
wisdom as to these and related problems of education is not likely
to be divined for all time even by the scholars who now so earnest-
ly debate the issues. In such circumstances the judiciary is well
advised to refrain from interposing on the States inflexible con-
stitutional restraints that could circumscribe or handicap the
continued research and experimentation so vital to finding even
partial solutions to educational problems and to keeping abreast
of ever changing conditions. 7
The Court concluded that "the ultimate solutions must come from
the lawmakers and from the democratic pressures of those who elect
them.""' In fact, even before the Court made its suggestion, Governor
Rockefeller had appointed a commission to "report on the quality,
cost, and financing of elementary and secondary education in New
York State, and to make recommendations for the improvement of
13. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex.
1971), rev'd, 41 U.S.L.W. 4407 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1973); Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp.
870 (D. Minn. 1971); Hollins v. Shofstall, No. C-253652 (Super. Ct. Ariz., Jan. 13, 1972);
Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Robinson v.
Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972).
14. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 605, 487 P.2d 1241, 1255-56, 96 Cal. Rptr.
601, 615-16 (1971).
15. 41 U.S.L.W. 4407 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1973).
16. Rodriguez may not be the end of the school finance cases as state courts are
still free to use state constitutional provisions to invalidate their own educational Ss
tems. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972). See Itso
Note, A Statistical Analysis of the School Finance Decisions: On Winning Battles and
Losing Wars, 81 YALE L.J. 1303, 1320-21 (1972).
17. 41 U.S.L.W. at 4420.
18. Id. at 4425.
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performance in all these dimensions." 0 The panel, which became
known as the Fleischmann Commission, interpreted their charge fair-
ly narrowly, however, and focused on the policy implications of edu-
cational finance.20
Their principal recommendation was that New York State, rather
than its local school districts, should finance all elementary and sec-
ondary schools through a uniform state property tax.21 Although
school administration was to remain a local responsibility,22 there
would be no local discretion with respect to expenditure levels.23 In
fact, one of the most important goals of the Commission was equal-
izing per pupil expenditures. 24 Such equality would not, however,
mean identical expenditures:
Equal sums of money shall be made available for each student,
unless a valid educational reason can be found for spending some
different amount.
2 5
Such "valid educational needs" would include disparities in student
needs or in schooling costs.20 Moreover, the formula for state expendi-
tures was to include a clearly compensatory factor termed "disadvan-
tage distribution":
[S]tudents who score at a low level in reading and mathematics
achievement [will] be weighted at 1.5, as against a weighting of
1.0 for other children, and . . . the proportion of students so
selected [will] be based upon the proportion of third-grade stu-
dents in each district who obtain marks at or below the third
stanine on third-grade reading and mathematics achievement
tests .... 27
While the Commission recommended using such additional funds for
elementary school expenditures,28 the school districts would be free
19. FL.amScI IANN at v.
20. Id. at vii-viii.
21. Id. at 62-63. A second ground for both the cases noted above and the Fleischmann
Commission was the equalization of the burden of local property taxes. While this
ground has undeniable political appeal, there is serious doubt that the judicial pro-
nouncements thus far would have been issued were taxpayer equality the only %aluc
at stake. See Note, A Statistical Analysis of tile School Finance Decisions: On Winning
Battles and Losing Wars, 81 YALE L.J. 1303, n.4, at 1315 (1972).
22. FisCHMAN at 55, 60-61, 86-87.
23. Id. at 63.
24. Id. at 54-55, 62.
25. Id. at 62.
26. Id. at 63.
27. Id. at 66 [footnotes omitted; emphasis deleted].
28. Id. at 67.
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to choose between various programs and services. 29 The Commission
made other "equalizing recommendations," including tax credits for
the poor30 and the subsidization of high-spending districts until the
low-spending ones were "leveled up."31 But the "disadvantage distribu-
tion" was by far the most expensive.3 2 The justification for this mas-
sive expenditure was that
[b]y investing heavily in the education of low-income children, the
state can redress the balance in human capital distribution and,
by extension, the future distribution of income. 83
It is, of course, precisely this "extension" from expenditures to edu-
cational achievement (and then to future income) that the Coleman
Report had called into question. Such niggling doubts were, how-
ever, dismissed by the Fleischmann Commission in what may be the
most revealing paragraph of their report:
Because of the lack of experimentally proven data on the learn-
ing process, it is currently fashionable in academic circles to assert
that more money for schools does not necessarily mean better
education. In a very narrow sense this may be true. For example,
it has never been proven that a student/teacher ratio of 28 to one
necessarily provides better education than a ratio of 30 to one for
normal children. But if it is true that minor variations in stu-
dent/teacher ratios are not highly significant for normal pupils,
it is even clearer that substantial differences in student/teacher
ratios are of controlling importance in the education of handi-
capped children. Here the effective ratio is not 30 to one but often
five to one. The expense of employing additional teachers for
these children cannot be avoided unless we are to relegate a sizable
percentage of our present school population to a hopelessly in-
ferior status for the rest of their lives. Apart from these extreme
situations, experience tells us that the amount of money expended
does make a meaningful difference in the quality of education.
4
The Commission thus makes one important point by inference: The
validity of the Coleman Report and similar studies is limited by the
fact that they considered the effects of only minor input variations.
This conclusion is, however, hardly beyond challenge. The relevance
29. Id.
30. Id. at 81-82.
31. Id. at 63-65. The estimated cost for "leveling up" to the sixty-fifth percentile for
1972-73 is $125 million. Id. at 66.
32. The estimated cost for 1972-73 is $465 million. Id. at 66.
33. Id. at 95.
34. Id. at 53-54.
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of the learning experience of the handicapped to overall school ex-
penditures is certainly also limited; and a "five to one" student/teacher
ratio is far better than that which the Commission recommends for
normal children. 35 Moreover, what "experience tells us" about addi-
tional school expenditures evidently excludes the "experience" record-
ed in the surveys of the late sixties. Finally, one might surely expect
more than intuition as a reason for spending an additional $700 mil-
lion of New York taxes.
30
It is interesting to note that the Commission's own findings on edu-
cational achievement are consistent with Coleman's, in that the central
conundrum for both is the fact that student achievement correlates
more with the pupil's socioeconomic background than with educa-
tional inputs.37 But the Commission sidesteps this problem with the
curiously cryptic contention that "something is wrong with the way
our educational system operates."38 Thus, Fleischmann defends the
belief that the educational system is still a primary vehicle for equal-
izing social inequalities: 39
[W]hile equality of expenditure in accordance with some rea-
sonable educational standard may not inevitably result in higher
quality education, we feel that such equality is the essential first
step toward achieving that goal. Without that equality, large num-
bers of children in districts lacking in financial resources are
doomed to inferior educational achievement. Society is fated to
assume the ever-increasing burden of supporting those who cannot
make their own way in the world.
40
III. Jencks: An Alternative Approach
Christopher Jencks and his associates contradict these assumptions.
To begin with, they reaffirm Coleman's finding that educational ex-
penditures do not significantly correlate with student achievement.
41
35. 3 REPORT OF THE NEW YOx STATE COMMISSION ON THE QUALI. COST AND FI-
NANCING OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDDUCATION 13.4-13.5 (official ed. 1973).
56. See FETISC MANN at 63-67.
37. The biggest problem in the state is the high correlation between school success
or failure and the student's socio-economic and racial origins. The higher on the
socio-economic scale a child is, the more likely he is to succeed in school. . . . In
spite of high expenditures and quality improvements, New York State is not pro-
viding equality of educational opportunity to its students as long as the pattern
of school success and school failure remains closely tied to a child's social origins.
Id. at 4.
38. Id. at 25.
39. See p. 1106 supra.
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Moreover, and more importantly, they seriously challenge the even
more sacred belief that student achievement is related to success in
later life.
The Jencks study is in fact directed toward the question of how
adults achieve their ultimate positions (measured primarily in terms
of income)42 in American society. 43 In light of the popular mythology
that education is necessary, some would say sufficient, for social mo-
bility, the Report's answers are particularly disconcerting:
Neither family background, cognitive skill, educational attain-
ment, nor occupational status explains much of the variation in
men's incomes. Indeed, when we compare men who are identical
in all these respects, we find only 12 to 15 percent less inequality
than among random individuals.4
4
Thus, Jencks clearly concentrates not on equal educational treat-
ment, but rather on equal results in our society. His study group did
consider equalizing educational achievement by giving less education
to the gifted and more to the less talented. But this arrangement was
soon rejected:
We think of "equal opportunity" as implying that everyone should
get as much schooling as he wants. Equal opportunity, in this
sense, guarantees unequal results.
45
Three principal conclusions of the Jencks study undercut the very
belief that schooling can remedy income inequality. First, the Report
concluded that "no measurable school resource or policy shows a con-
sistent relationship to schools' effectiveness in boosting student achieve-
ment."46 Second, as noted above, Jencks found that the "quality" of
education as measured by standardized test scores did not correlate
with income achievement. Finally, the group found that the factors
which do appear to correlate with economic success are largely beyond
the reach of public policy.
47
Jencks is thus dubious of any recommendation that seeks to equalize
income through intermediate programs. 48 He concludes that little
42. Id. at 209-46. There was also some brief attempt to assess inequality in terms of
occupational status (id. at 176-208) and job satisfaction (id. at 247-52).
45. See id. at 11-12.
44. Id. at 226.
45. Id. at 109.
46. Id. at 96.
47. Id. at 226-27. One such factor is heredity, to which Jencks devotes a subchapter
and a substantial appendix. Id. at 64-84, 266-319.
48. Id. at 29, 109.
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progress towards reducing economic inequality will be made by even
"ingenious manipulations of marginal institutions like the schools," 49
and contends that direct political control over the economy-in a word,
socialism-will be necessary to achieve an equitable income distri-
bution.50
These conclusions do not, however, lead Jencks to advocate edu-
cational budget reductions or abandonment of the schools; rather, he
suggests a different approach to public education. Jencks would have
schools viewed less as factories for a particular product-educational
and hence, economic equality-and more as a place where young peo-
ple can spend time in a stimulating, pleasant environment. 1 Indeed,
Jencks is optimistic, even enthusiastic, about equalizing school expen-
ditures in the name of justice, if not equalizing educational "outputs":
The case for equalizing expenditures must ... rest on a simpler
logic, which asserts that public money ought to be equitably dis-
tributed even if the distribution of such money has no long-term
effect.5
2
IV. Equalization: At What Price?
Theoretically, the recommendations of Fleischmann and Jencks are
not incompatible. A society could equalize school financing, increase
school expenditures, and still directly redistribute income. In practice,
however, a society with limited resources must choose among these
courses. Committed to certain "necessary" expenditures, such as police,
defense, or highway programs, it will have a limited reservoir of funds
available for specifically reducing inequality. The marginal effect of
this "equalizing dollar" will vary among programs. While programs
justifiable on other grounds, such as health care, will include some
compensatory component, the willingness of the society to tax itself
for "equalizing" individual positions is both politically and economi-
49. Id. at 265.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 256. Other commentators have shared this view:
Inequities in the provision of a service as fundamental and as universal as educa-
tion demand justification, not because they "cause" educational harm but rather
because they represent a continuing political insult, a declaration that the poor are
not entitled to as much of the larger community's educational resources as are the
rich.
Kirp & Yudoff, Serrano in the Political Arena, 2 YALE REV. OF L & Soc. ACr. 142, 144-45
(1971). See Jr.NcKs at 22-23 for conclusion that over their lifetimes, poor children and
black children receive a lower proportion of school expenditures than do middle-class
and white children.
52. JENc s 29.
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cally limited. A society which expends its "equalizing dollars" on com-
pensatory education is less likely to spend, or continue to spend, large
amounts on direct income maintenance.
A society is also limited in its reserves of energy and hope. Jencks'
conclusion that public education has borne excessive expectations-
which no one realized it could never fulfill-helps explain the high
level of support public schooling has received. But if these expecta-
tions are now dashed and the schools are no longer viewed as the
gTeat leveling force in our society, it seems unlikely that the same
level of public funding will be available. 53 This could well be the
real import-and the perhaps real danger-of the Coleman-Jencks line.
In the final analysis, both Fleischmann and Jencks alert us to the
need to assess public policies in terms of results, not treatment. Their
common perception that the public schools are not now delivering
equality of opportunity, treatment, or result challenges educators and
politicians alike. However, tension among these objectives, combined
with the Coleman uncertainties about achieving any of them through
conventional school or fiscal reform, may well lead us to the conclusion
that American society has simply overloaded public education with too
many hopes and dreams. It is perhaps this overload, and its impli-
cations for education, which must be evaluated before we either in-
vest additional billions in the schools or abandon them for wholly
different social strategies.
53. Indeed, Jencks and Coleman are already being cited by opponents of larger school
expenditures. See Hodgson, Do Schools Make a Difference?, TIlE ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
March, 1973, at 45-46. See also Symposium-Perspectives on Inequality: A Reassessment of
the Effect of Family and Schooling in America, 43 HARV. ED. REV., Feb. 1973, at 37.
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